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We extend the sudden stops literature by allowing crisis episodes to be caused by either the 
retreat of global investors, as is assumed but not shown in the extant literature, or the sudden 
flight of local investors. We find that almost half of the previously defined sudden stops are 
actually episodes of sudden flight. Compared to sudden flight, true sudden stops are bunched and 
are associated with greater slowdowns in economic activity and sharper currency depreciations. 
We show that the empirical regularities of sudden flight and true sudden stops are consistent with 
theoretical models that incorporate gross capital flows and information asymmetries. 
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 1. Introduction 
International capital flows can have many benefits for an emerging market economy. For 
example, foreign flows can result in a reduction in systematic risk (Chari and Henry, 2004) and 
an increase in both physical investment (Henry 2000, 2003) and economic growth (Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad 2001, 2005). Moreover, the act of restraining capital flows can be costly 
along various dimensions to firms in the emerging market (especially those firms without 
preferential access to capital) and to the country as a whole (Forbes, 2005). However, any 
positive aspects of capital flows must be tempered by the fact that their sudden reversal can spark 
crises. Indeed, the entire literature on sudden stops is focused on identifying and ascertaining the 
damage caused by crises precipitated by the actions of foreign investors.
1   
The burgeoning sudden stops literature has identified three basic characteristics of this 
particular type of emerging market crisis.  First, sudden stops can inflict a great deal of pain, as 
they are often accompanied by sharp declines in the exchange rate and in economic activity. 
Second, sudden stops are not infrequent; an emerging market country can expect to be buffeted 
by a sudden stop every decade (Edwards, 2005). Third, as noted by virtually all researchers in 
this literature—including but not limited to Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Frankel and 
Cavallo (2004), and Mendoza (2006)—sudden stops are caused by foreign investors. Edwards 
(2005, page 14) succinctly states this last point: “A sudden stop episode (i)s an abrupt and major 
reduction in capital inflows to a country that up to that time had been receiving large volumes of 
foreign capital.”  
In the face of the frequent pain brought on by foreign investors, it is not surprising that 
prominent academics (Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000) question the benefits of financial 
globalization. Moreover, emerging market policy makers, faced with such a world, cannot be 
                                                      
1 See, among many others, Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes (1995), Calvo (1998), and Mendoza and Smith (2006). faulted if they consider erecting walls around their financial systems. A natural policy response 
to frequent pain imposed by foreigners is to limit their access to local markets. 
The primary goal in this paper is to address one very simple question: To what extent are 
crises, as identified in the sudden stops literature, brought on by the actions of local investors 
rather than foreign ones?  We tackle this question by extending the extant literature to 
incorporate the actions of local investors. Capital flight is, of course, not unknown to academics 
and policy makers—see, among others, Dooley (1988), Khan and Ul Haque (1985), and Lessard 
and Williamson (1987)—but is absent in the current wave of research on sudden stops.
2  Our 
analysis indicates that nearly half the crises episodes established by the sudden stops literature 
are actually episodes of sudden flight in which those who are exiting the market are, to a large 
extent, local investors. 
The extant sudden stops literature lumps episodes of sudden flight together with what we 
call true sudden stops because, while described in terms of gross capital inflows, in practice 
sudden stops are identified using data on net capital flows. Because the data are of net flows, so 
too are theoretical models—incorporating gross flows would be an unnecessary complication.
3 
The sudden stops literature conjures up a scene in which gross capital inflows dry up, but in 
practice extant analyses combine the actions of local investors with those of foreigners.  
We find that a substantial portion of traditionally defined sudden stops episodes are 
actually sudden flight. After following the literature to identify episodes, we define sudden flight 
as an episode in which gross capital outflows increase more than gross capital inflows decrease. 
As it is built from relatively blunt quarterly data on gross capital flows, our measure likely 
                                                      
2 The reader who has not noticed this wave can consult any of the 35 NBER working papers issued since January 
2004 that contain ‘sudden stop(s)’ in the abstract.  By contrast, over that period only 7 NBER papers contained the 
word ‘flight’ in the abstract, and all but one of those concerned flight-to-quality.  
3 Or maybe the causation is reversed. Traditional international macro models incorporate net flows, so there was no 
impetus to search beyond net flows to the gross components. 
  2understates the incidence of sudden flight.  For example, some episodes that have been described 
in case studies to be flight—for example, the Frankel and Schmukler (1996) analysis of the 
Mexican crisis and the Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil and Tesar (2006) study of the Argentine 
Corralito episode—will appear to be true sudden stops.
4 That said, our measure shows that 
almost half (24) of the 55 episodes are sudden flight in which domestic investors’ flight to global 
capital markets exceeds the slowdown in global investors’ flows into the crisis country. These 
are not situations in which emerging markets are cut off from global capital markets. Rather, the 
emerging market investors have ample access and utilize it by moving their funds abroad. We 
then show that, compared with sudden flight, true sudden stops are associated with more 
pronounced slowdowns in GDP and sharper currency depreciations. In addition, true sudden 
stops are bunched, which is supportive of a contagion effect, while episodes of sudden flight are 
more dispersed. 
Our results suggest that the extant theoretical literature on sudden stops should also be 
reevaluated. Most analyses of sudden stops are placed in the realm of net capital flows and 
utilize traditional international macroeconomic models, such as real business cycle and new open 
economy macro models. While net capital flows are clearly an important concept, we live in a 
world of substantial two-way gross capital flows and sudden stops, being a trading phenomenon, 
should be framed in a trading model that incorporates information asymmetries and gross flows. 
We show that the Brennan and Cao (1997) dynamic generalization of the multiasset noisy 
rational expectations model of Admati (1985), after relaxing some assumptions, is well-suited for 
framing true sudden stops in a way that also allows for sudden flight. In the model sudden flight 
                                                      
4 It is also possible that some of the investments implemented by locals actually to decisions made by global 
investors. For example, the Chilean episode of 1998 owes, in part, to a shift in bank deposits from Chilean to foreign 
banks, but there is some evidence that Spanish parent companies were behind this shift. We thank Ricardo Caballero 
for bringing this to our attention. 
  3can occur if informed locals with superior information foresee a negative shock to the local 
market and in anticipation shift money to global markets. Net inflows decline, but the decline is 
prompted not by global investors. True sudden stops (and contagion) can occur if global 
investors sell emerging market assets when they receive a negative signal that could well 
originate from the actions of other global investors. 
Our study is important for at least three reasons. First, theory is progressing on the 
assumption that during a sudden stop the emerging market is cut off from global capital markets. 
Mendoza (2006) discusses dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that can match the 
empirical regularities of sudden stops. In motivating his search for appropriate models, Mendoza 
notes that real business cycle and new open economy macro models—models that have 
traditionally allowed for net, not gross, capital flows—are not up to the task, in part because “just 
when the dominant paradigms predict that agents need capital markets the most, agents cannot 
borrow at all.” Caballero and Panageas (2005) predicts the likelihood of sudden stops in which 
emerging markets are required “at a moment’s notice…to reverse the capital inflows that 
supported the preceding boom.” To the extent that theory is validated by matching its predictions 
to the empirical stylized facts, getting those facts correct is vital.  
Second, empirical work is currently searching for preconditions that make countries more 
(or less) prone to sudden stops. The nascent literature on the interaction between openness and 
sudden stops appears, to an outsider, somewhat confusing in that it suggests that more open 
countries are either more susceptible to sudden stops (Calvo et al., 2004) or less susceptible 
(Edwards, 2005; Frankel and Cavallo, 2004) and that more open countries either have more 
  4severe crises (Edwards, 2005) or less severe ones (Edwards, 2004).
5 If sudden flight is 
fundamentally different from true sudden stops, the mixing of the two is contaminating analysis.  
Finally, our study is important because to the extent that theoretical and empirical work 
on sudden stops will morph into policy prescriptions, the proper identification of these episodes 
is vital. By lumping flight with stops, the extant literature increases the likelihood of 
recommending policies that impede global investors, when—at least in the case of flight 
episodes—often it is local policies that must be reexamined. 
The precursors to our paper include the very recent but substantial literature on sudden 
stops (described throughout this paper); the older literature on capital flight (mentioned above); 
as well as two recent papers that have focused on gross flows. Faucette, Rothenberg, and 
Warnock (2005) showed that a non-trivial portion of a restricted sample of Calvo et al. (2004) 
sudden stops episodes were brought on by the flight of domestic investors, while Cowan and De 
Gregorio (2005) presents a very informative case study of Chilean gross flows. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present empirical regularities of 
stops and flight episodes by defining empirically true sudden stops and sudden flight, describing 
the evolution of gross flows around both types of episodes, and characterizing stops and flight by 
examining the reaction of economic activity and the exchange rate during both types of episodes. 
In Section 3, we sketch a refocused version of the Brennan and Cao (1997) model of gross 
capital flows and information asymmetries, which we argue is the type of model that can inform 
                                                      
5 It must be noted that openness is defined differently in these papers. Edwards (2004) uses a trade-to-GDP ratio to 
measure openness. Frankel and Cavallo (2004) instrument for trade using gravity variables. Calvo et al. (2004) 
utilize the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods to define openness. In Edwards (2005), openness is given by a new 
capital mobility index that is a combination of Quinn (2003), Mody and Murshid (2002), and country-specific 
information. While the index is designed to provide information on the extent or severity of capital controls, it is 
used only to place countries in buckets of low, intermediate, and high capital mobility. Analysis is based on groups, 
not index scores, with the middle group (roughly 140 of the 160 countries) dropped from most of the analysis.  
  5our understanding of true sudden stops and sudden flight. We conclude in Section 4.  All data are 
described in the appendix. 
 
2. The Stylized Facts 
In this section we establish some stylized facts of sudden flight and true sudden stops. In 
a true sudden stop, net capital inflows decline because foreigners have exited the emerging 
market. In a sudden flight, the episode is caused by locals exiting to global markets. Both types 
of episodes are associated with a sharp decrease in net capital inflows.  
 
2.1. Defining an Episode 
We follow the sudden stops literature in defining crisis episodes, which we later separate 
into true sudden stops and sudden flight. Following Calvo et al. (2004) we first construct a 
monthly capital flows proxy, Pt, computed by subtracting monthly changes in international 
reserves from the quarterly current account balance, and then define Ct to be a 12-month moving 







i t t P C             t = 1, 2, …, N                                   (1) 
 
We then compute annual changes in Ct: 
 
12 − − = ∆ t t t C C C     t = 1, 2, …, N                                  (2)  
 
  6As in the sudden stops literature,   is the focus of our indicator. The first month t that  t C ∆ t C ∆  
falls one standard deviation below its mean is marked as the beginning of an episode.
6 The 
episode ends once   again exceeds one standard deviation below its mean. In addition, within 
the episode, there must be at least one time t when 
t C ∆
t C ∆  falls at least two standard deviations 
below its mean.  
Figure 1 depicts how the standard sudden stop indicator is constructed for one country 
(Argentina). The solid line plots  , with one and two standard deviations below the mean 
depicted by the upper and lower dashed lines. For example, in 1995 Argentina experienced a 
decrease in net capital inflows. The episode begins once net inflows fall one standard deviation 
below the historical mean, providing net capital inflows eventually fall below the two standard 
deviation line. In this case net inflows did continue to fall. Note that the criteria do not require 
flows to reverse to net outflows, just that net flows decline. The episode ends when net inflows 
rise above the one standard deviation line.  
t C ∆
  To construct these indicators, we gather underlying data on exports, imports, and reserves 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database (IFS) or from Haver Analytics if IFS 
data are unavailable or incomplete. We search across a broad set of 28 emerging markets; our 
data enable us to create indicators which span the period from 1989 through 2005. We find that 
among these 28 countries, 70 episodes occurred over the sample period.  That is, on average over 
the 16-year period we study, each country was inflicted by a crisis episode 2.5 times.  Crises, so 
defined, are not infrequent. 
 
                                                      
6 We compute rolling means and standard deviations that for month t incorporate all data from January 1987 to 
month t. Following Calvo et al. (2004), we require 24 months of data; thus our indicators begin tracking countries in 
January 1989. Our last data point is December 2005. 
  72.2. Differentiating between Sudden Flight and True Sudden Stops 
Up to this point, our episode characterization is standard and not different in spirit from 
Calvo et al. (2004) or Frankel and Cavallo (2004).  We now break from the extant literature and 
differentiate between episodes that were true sudden stops of inflows and those that owe to 
sudden flight. To differentiate between the two, we require somewhat more detailed balance of 
payments (BOP) data on gross capital flows.  
We term an episode a sudden flight if it owed primarily to local residents sending their 
money abroad. Specifically, a sudden flight is one in which the increase in gross financial 
outflows from te = -3,-2,-1,0 to te = 1,2,3,4 is greater than the decrease in gross financial inflows 
over the same period. In contrast, in a true sudden stop, which owes primarily to the actions of 
global investors; the decrease in gross inflows exceeds the increase in gross outflows.
7
  Excluding episodes with missing BOP data—in 15 cases we were unable to find data on 
gross capital flows—leaves us with 55 episodes that occurred in 24 emerging markets (Table 1). 
Of the 55 episodes, we found that 31 were indeed true sudden stops, but 24 were sudden flight. 
On average, over our 16-year sample period each country was inflicted by a true sudden stop 1.3 
times and by sudden flight once.  True sudden stops are less frequent than portrayed in the 
literature. 
Our method likely understates the proportion of episodes that were triggered by sudden 
flight. For example, we utilize data on reported financial flows. Large negative net errors and 
omissions during crises are likely indicative of unreported financial outflows; not knowing this 
for certain, we rely only on reported financial flows.  Moreover, some episodes that have been 
                                                      
7 Note that episodes are first identified using net flows data before gross flows data are used to separate flight from 
stops. An alternative way to define true sudden stops and sudden flight might begin with the gross flows data. This 
alternative, while potentially appealing, has at least two drawbacks.  First, in the end it is net flows that matter.  For 
example, a surge in gross outflows when inflows are sizeable is not generally thought of as a crisis; it is usually 
called international portfolio diversification.  Second, gross flows data for emerging markets are not up to the task in 
terms of frequency, completeness, and quality. 
  8shown using case studies to have been prompted by the flight of locals appear as sudden stops 
using blunt quarterly BOP data on gross flows. An example is the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis, 
which was shown by Frankel and Schmukler (1996) to be triggered by the flight of local 
investors. However, it is a sudden stop using our coding technique because the sheer size of the 
retrenchment by foreigners (once they took the signal from the locals) far exceeded the 
magnitude of local flight.  A more recent example is the flight from Argentina in 2001 (see 
Auguste et al. 2006), which is also a true sudden stop using our methodology.  Case studies will 
always be able to drill down more deeply into any single episode. 
 
2.3. Characteristics of Sudden Flight and True Sudden Stops 
Gross Capital Flows 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of gross capital inflows for all episodes (Fig. 2a), true 
sudden stops (Fig. 2b), and episodes of sudden flight (Fig. 2c). Across traditionally defined 
episodes, gross financial inflows fall sharply, but they rebound very quickly.
8 This quick 
resumption of inflows is clearly not what the sudden stops literature is built on—even the 
strongest countries can face a one-quarter pause in gross inflows. For true sudden stops, as the 
literature suggests, gross inflows drop off considerably and remain modest for a full year, the 
painful period during which the emerging market economy is starved for capital but receives 
none.  Episodes of sudden flight are also characterized by a slowdown in inflows, but here the 
slowdown is only temporary and is followed by very strong inflows for the next two years.
9
  
                                                      
8 To be included in a figure an episode must have complete data for the entire sample depicted. For example, in 
Figure 2, we have only 47 episodes because inclusion requires 8 quarters of gross flows data before and after the 
beginning of an episode. The figure is compiled using means; the contours of gross inflows are very similar if we 
use medians (not shown). 
9 Sudden flight episodes are counted as episodes in the existing literature because the temporary slowdown in 
inflows is accompanied by a surge in outflows.  
  9Bilateral Securities Positions vis-à-vis the United States 
Figure 3 provides another view of the distinction between flight (dashed lines) and true 
stops (solid lines). The figure shows the evolution of U.S. investors’ positions in the inflicted 
countries’ stocks and bonds (left side), as well as these countries’ positions in U.S. equities and 
bonds (right side). During a sudden flight, U.S. investors increase their positions in emerging 
market equities and, to a lesser extent, bonds, while local investors increase their positions in 
U.S. securities. During a true sudden stop, U.S. investors decrease their positions in the emerging 
market securities, first in equities but later in bonds, too. 
 
Severity and Time Bunching 
  We next attempt to determine if there are substantial differences between stops and flight 
by examining the performance of real GDP, its components, and the currency before, during, and 
after each episode. Compared to sudden flight episodes, true sudden stops are accompanied by 
larger slowdowns in overall GDP as well as consumption and investment (Figure 4). For 
example, in the four quarters following the onset of a true sudden stop, GDP growth slows to 
near zero, whereas the slowdown during sudden flight is modest. For stops, the slowdown owes 
to declines in consumption and investment that are not offset by the surge in net exports.  The 
figure does not portray the considerable variation within each type of episode, but graphs using 
medians (not shown) are similar and, at the 10% level, growth in GDP, consumption, and 
imports is significantly lower in stops than in flight episodes. True sudden stops are painful.
10
                                                      
10 Recently, many researchers in the sudden stops literature have followed the lead of Calvo et al. (2004) and begun 
to impose the additional ad hoc requirement that the episode must be painful, where ‘pain’ is defined as an absolute 
drop in GDP during the sudden stop episode. Our work suggests that true sudden stops are painful, so there is no 
need to impose pain in an ad hoc way. 
  10True sudden stops are also accompanied by a sharp depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate (Figure 5).
11 In contrast, at the onset of sudden flight the currency depreciation is quite 
muted, although depreciations are slightly larger leading into it. Most of the dramatic change in 
the exchange rate owes to two countries (Argentina and Brazil); median changes are more muted 
and the difference between stops and flight is not significant at the 10% level. Figures 4 and 5 
are not unrelated: To the extent that emerging markets have difficulties borrowing in their local 
currency (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004; Burger and Warnock 2006a, 2006b), the 
depreciation has immediate balance sheet effects that will adversely impact economic activity 
(Calvo et al., 2004; Mendoza and Smith, 2006). 
  Figure 6 plots the time-bunching of sudden stops episodes by the type of episode. True 
sudden stops are bunched from 1997 through 2001. In contrast, sudden flight episodes appear to 
be isolated across time. These charts are suggestive of a world in which true sudden stops have 
an important common component—and that perhaps for them contagion is an apt descriptor—
whereas sudden flight episodes are more likely driven by local conditions. 
 
3. A Model of Flight and Stops 
The literature on sudden stops utilizes various international macro models, from real 
business cycle to new open economy macro to debt-deflation models; see Mendoza (2006) for a 
useful summary. However, the stylized facts suggest that these crisis episodes are best framed in 
the context of the canonical model of gross flows and information asymmetries: the Brennan and 
Cao (1997) dynamic generalization of the multiasset noisy rational expectations model of 
Admati (1985). While the focus of Brennan and Cao (1997) was not on sudden stops but rather 
                                                      
11 Movements in real exchange rates (not shown) are very similar because changes in relative inflation rates are 
minimal. 
  11on the returns-chasing behavior of U.S. investors,
12 we present a version of their model (with a 
slight re-emphasis and slightly different assumptions) that can inform our understanding of 
sudden stops and sudden flight. 
In the model, country of residence matters. There are M risky assets, each of which can 
be thought of as being a country’s equity index. Each risky asset has a terminal payoff realized at 
time 1 given by an Mx1 normally distributed random vector U
~
 that has meanU and precision 
matrix H. Everyone has access to a riskless interest rate of zero. An investor in country i, 
, is endowed at time 0 with quantities of the risky assets given by the vector X ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i
i. The 
investors have exponential utility functions defined over time 1 terminal consumption with 
common CARA of 1/r. The vector of aggregate per capita supply of the risky assets, 0
~
X , is 
normally and independently distributed with mean 0 X and precision matrix Φ0. The T trading 
sessions are held at times τt = t/T, t=0,…,T-1, and at time 1 asset payoffs are realized and 
consumption takes place. 





the asset payoffs: 




t U Z ε ~ ~ ~




t ε ~  is distributed normally and independently of U
~
, has mean zero, and is independent of 
k
j ε ~  if k≠i or j≠t. The precision matrix of private signals received by investor i just before session 
t is denoted by . 
i
t S
                                                      
12 For more recent empirical evidence on the trading behavior of U.S. investors, see Thomas, Warnock, and 
Wongswan (2006) and Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2006). 
  12Prior to trading session t=0,…,T-1 each investor i gets an Mx1 vector of public signals 
t Y
~
about the asset payoffs: 
 
   t t U Y η ~ ~ ~
+ =          (4) 
 
where is distributed normally with mean zero and precision matrix N t η ~
t. It is assumed 




T N N 0
~
Y = 0) 
and all risky asset returns are realized at session T.  
New liquidity traders enter the market in each trading session t=1, …,T-1. The 
incremental net supply of liquidity traders is given by the normally distributed random 
vectors, t X
~
, which have means t X  and precision matrices Φt. Let  t X = 0 for t>0, and assume that 
the total trading volume is not observable by traders (to preserve the less than fully revealing 
nature of the rational expectations equilibrium). 
Letting  t P
~




 denote the vector of 
risky asset demands for investor i in trading session t, then solution techniques of Admati (1985) 
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That is, investor i’s trading strategy depends on 






t P Z S − : The difference between his vector of private signals in period t and the 
vector of prices, weighted by his private signal precision matrix; 
b)  )
~ ~
( t t P U S − − : The difference between the vector of the average private signal and the 
vector of prices, weighted by the average private signal precision matrix; 
c)  the vector of supply shocks due to new liquidity trades; and 
d)  : the (negative of the) vector of price changes, weighted by the 
difference between the investor’s private signal precision matrix and the market average 
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t P U S P Z S − − − , which shows that investor i will 
buy in markets for which he receives a private signal that is stronger than the average investors’ 
private signal (as long as his signal is sufficiently precise). Point (d) shows that investors will 
follow momentum strategies in countries in which they have a cumulative information 
disadvantage; if   then investor i will chase price movements, buying when prices 
increase and selling when prices decline. 
j
i
j S S <
To focus on the returns-chasing component (point d), Brennan and Cao (1997) imposed 
that information endowments are symmetric. The symmetry assumption imposed that the 
elements of an investor’s precision matrix do not differ across foreign markets (and can be zero); 
with this assumption, trades are a function only of market returns. In contrast, we allow for a role 
for (a) and (b) and thus allow for asymmetric information across foreign markets.  
We next focus on the implications of the model for a particular emerging market e and a 
country g with global investors. Consider first the trades of global investors in the emerging 
  14market. Abstracting from liquidity trades, the global investor’s trading in the emerging market’s 
assets will be governed by the Information Trade and Returns-Chasing. The Information Trade in 










t e P U S P Z S − − −        ( 6 )  
 
The global investor will buy emerging market assets if he receives a stronger than average 
positive signal about e. Note that this positive e signal can owe to information about strong 
fundamentals in e, or it could be due to a strong, precise negative signal about g. It could also, as 
suggested by Albuquerque et al. (2006), originate from information about the likely actions of 
other g-type investors. This information about other g-type investors can be termed a global 
private signal; the investment business is sufficiently global that it is not unlikely that funds 
based in America are aware of the likely actions of other global investors. Conversely, global 
investors will sell emerging market assets if they receive negative news about the emerging 
market or relatively positive news about other markets. Moreover, they will also sell emerging 
market assets if they receive a global private signal that other g-type investors will sell.  













t e j e
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  15With returns chasing, if g has a cumulative information disadvantage in e, then he will buy e on 
price increases (thinking that someone must have strongly positive private information on e) and 
sell e on price declines.  
Similar expressions can be derived for emerging market investors’ trades in global 
markets. For instance, an investor from an emerging market will move into global markets when 
he receives a negative signal about his home market.  Which effect dominates—Information 
Trade or Returns Chasing—depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal and cumulative 
information (dis)advantages.
13  
The canonical Brennan and Cao (1997) model predicts that emerging markets are not 
always culpable for sharp declines in net inflows. Errors in local public and global private signals 
result in too many inflows when positive and too many outflows when negative. If informed 
global investors receive a negative global signal, we expect to see outflows from emerging 
markets that are not associated with local fundamentals. But there are also times during which 
the locals are behind the outflows. When locals receive a negative local private signal, they head 
for global markets, selling to foreigners on their way out.  
In terms of the sudden stops language, true sudden stops can be caused (i) by global 
investors recoiling from all markets because of a negative (private) signal about global markets, 
or (ii) by global investors misinterpreting and overreacting to a perceived negative (public) 
signal about an emerging market. Sudden flight, in contrast, owes to locals exiting their markets 
because of a negative (private) signal about the local economy. Another implication is that, 
relative to episodes of sudden flight, sudden stops should be bunched in time across countries (as 
Figure 6 showed). 
                                                      
13 For their particular focus, Brennan and Cao (1997) assumes the cumulative (dis)advantage dominates, but we do 
not require such an assumption. 
  16In summary, the Brennan and Cao (1997) model of information asymmetries and gross 
flows is consistent with the stylized facts of sudden stops and sudden flight. As such, it is a 
useful alternative to the classes of models currently used to analyze sudden stops. Sudden stops 
are trading phenomena that are usefully framed in a trading model. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  Episodes of sudden flight—absent from the burgeoning literature on emerging market 
crises—can owe to the rational trades of locals who have superior information about upcoming 
negative news about the local (emerging) market. Empirically, many emerging market crises that 
were previously categorized as sudden stops of capital inflows are actually sudden flight 
episodes in which locals exit to global markets. The two types of episodes differ in important 
ways, with true sudden stops being accompanied by substantially more pain in the form of 
sharper declines in economic activity and the currency. By distinguishing between flight and 
stops, future work can provide a better understanding of the conditions that lead to each type of 
infliction. Moreover, for those who want to focus on true sudden stops, removing sudden flight 
episodes from their analysis should lead to sharper empirical results and, hence, better informed 
policy prescriptions. 
  Many different types of theoretical international macroeconomic models are currently 
used to study sudden stops. Our hope is that our work prompts researchers in this impressive 
literature to incorporate gross flows in their models. 
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  20Appendix: Description of Data 
 
We rely on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) where possible.  Specifically, we 
utilize IFS data on the current account balance (line 78ald), exports (line 78aad), imports (line 
78abd), international reserves (line 1l.d), and the nominal exchange rate (line rf). 
 
In addition, we gather data on gross flows from IFS.  In keeping with BOP accounting, the term 
Inflows refers to the net purchases by foreigners of the country’s securities, instruments, or firms, 
while Outflows refers to the net purchases by the country’s residents of foreign securities, 
instruments, or firms.  Because in BOP accounting outflows are reported with a negative sign, 
we multiply outflows by negative one to obtain the magnitude of gross outflows.  Specifically, 
gross inflows and outflows are defined as 
 
Gross Financial Inflows = Inflows of FDI (IFS line 78bed) + Portfolio Debt and Equity 
Inflows (IFS line 78bgd) + Other Investment Inflows (IFS line 78bid) 
 
Gross Financial Outflows = -[Outflows of FDI (IFS line 78bdd) + Portfolio Debt and 
Equity Outflows (IFS line 78bfd) + Other Investment Outflows (IFS line 78bhd)] 
 
U.S. investors’ positions in the country’s securities and the country’s positions in U.S. securities 
are constructed as in Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2006). 
 
For data on real GDP and its components, we rely on estimates produced by individual country 
statistical agencies and compiled by Haver Analytics.  These series often have longer samples 
than those from IFS and generally have better coverage of components.  The GDP data are 
seasonally adjusted, and we take percent changes at annual rates for use in our severity 
comparisons. 
 
In all cases, when missing values exist in the current IFS data set, we turn to Haver Analytics 
databases to search for the replacement data. 
  21Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Sudden Stop Episodes 
The table shows for all episodes the dates, the change in gross outflows and gross inflows for the one year 
leading up to and following the onset of the episodes, and whether the episodes is a true sudden stop 
(TSS) or sudden flight (SF). 
 
Timing of Episode  Change in Gross Capital Flows from te=-3,-
2,-1,0 to te=1,2,3,4  Type of Episode 
  Gross Outflows  Gross Inflows 
  
Start Date  End Date 
(Billions of USD) 
 
Argentina I  Mar-89 Jan-90  1.28  -7.17  TSS 
Argentina II  Jan-95 Dec-95  6.76  -0.17  SF 
Argentina III  Aug-99 Nov-99  -1.66  -5.45  TSS 
Argentina IV  Mar-01 Oct-02  -1.67  -24.49  TSS 
Brazil I  Mar-93 Nov-93  3.56  5.27  SF 
Brazil II  Feb-95 Jun-95  -4.35  16.93  SF 
Brazil III  Jan-97 Jun-97  -3.99  -12.50  TSS 
Brazil IV  Jan-99 Aug-99  -3.48  -15.40  TSS 
Chile I  Jul-91 Apr-92  -1.45  1.01  TSS 
Chile II  Oct-95 Aug-96  1.19  1.84  SF 
Chile III  Jun-98 Jul-99  5.61  -1.23  SF 
Chile IV  Jan-04 Mar-05  2.83  -0.44  SF 
Colombia II  Apr-98 Jun-00  -0.02  -2.78  TSS 
Czech Rep   Jan-97 Mar-97  2.04  -1.04  SF 
Greece IV  Oct-99 Mar-01  -7.48  -1.92  TSS 
Hungary   Dec-96 Jun-97  0.97  -0.51  SF 
India I  May-93 Sep-93  -1.23  3.19  SF 
India II  May-95 May-96  4.26  -0.17  SF 
Indonesia I  Oct-92 Nov-93  0.18  -2.28  TSS 
Indonesia II  Dec-97 Nov-98  -0.29  -28.71  TSS 
Indonesia III  Dec-99 Nov-00  0.06  -3.11  TSS 
Jordan I  Dec-91 Jul-92  -0.23  -0.80  TSS 
Jordan II  Dec-94 Apr-95  0.49  0.53  SF 
Jordan III  Oct-98 Jun-99  0.23  0.81  SF 
Korea I  Sep-97 Nov-98  -11.56  -55.72  TSS 
Korea II  Apr-01 Dec-01  -2.60  3.17  SF 
Mexico   Apr-94 Mar-95  -1.40  -42.12  TSS 
Pakistan I  Sep-95 Nov-95  -0.07  1.24  SF 
Pakistan II  May-98 Jan-99  0.07  -3.61  TSS 
Pakistan III  Dec-03 Aug-04  0.09  0.00  SF 
Peru II  Jul-97 Feb-98  0.15  -1.13  TSS 
Peru III  Feb-99 Nov-99  0.04  -1.19  TSS 
Philippines I  Jun-95 Oct-95  0.02  3.99  SF 
Philippines II  Jun-97 Jul-99  -4.49  -10.92  TSS 
Philippines III  Jan-00 Jun-01  -3.40  -5.19  TSS 
Poland I  Jan-90 Sep-90  4.39  -2.72  SF 
Portugal I  Jan-89 May-89  -1.16  2.55  SF 
Portugal II  Mar-91 Aug-91  -0.63  1.34  SF 
Portugal III  Oct-92 Oct-93  6.23  0.75  SF 
S. Africa   Nov-96 Jan-97  5.19  10.59  SF 
Slovak Rep I  Jul-97 Apr-98  -1.82  -0.78  TSS 
Slovak Rep II  Apr-99 Sep-99  1.44  1.58  SF 
  22Slovak Rep III  Aug-03 Jul-04  0.98  -3.89  TSS 
Sri Lanka I  Mar-89 Sep-89  0.00  0.32  SF 
Sri Lanka II  Feb-95 Aug-96  0.00  -0.23  TSS 
Sri Lanka III  Nov-00 Feb-01  0.02  -0.74  TSS 
Thailand I  Oct-91 Dec-92  0.85  -3.56  TSS 
Thailand II  Dec-96 Jul-98  2.26  -19.49  TSS 
Turkey I  May-91 Jan-92  0.15  -1.75  TSS 
Turkey II  Mar-94 Jan-95  -6.28  -19.43  TSS 
Turkey III  Oct-98 Sep-99  -11.83  -2.43  TSS 
Turkey IV  Jun-01 Mar-02  -0.45  -13.01  TSS 
Venezuela II  Mar-00 Apr-01  0.90  -1.55  TSS 
Zimbabwe I  Nov-93 Jan-94  0.32  0.03  SF 
Zimbabwe II  Apr-94 Oct-94  0.15  -0.15  TSS 
 
 
  23Figure 1.  Indicator Construction 
The figure shows the traditional construction of a sudden stops indicator for Argentina.  Shaded areas are 
episodes, which begin when the capital flows proxy (the solid line) drops one standard deviation below its 
historical mean (the upper dashed line), provided the proxy eventually falls two standard deviations below 
its mean (the lower dashed line).  The episode ends when the proxy again crosses the one standard 
deviation line. 
  24Figure 2. Gross Inflows During All Episodes, True Sudden Stops, and Sudden Flight 
The figures depict mean gross inflows during 47 episodes (27 true sudden stops and 20 sudden flight). 
Event time is in quarters, with zero being the beginning of the episode. 
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  26Figure 3. Evolution of Bilateral Positions in Equities and Bonds 
The figures depict mean quarterly changes in U.S. positions in inflicted countries and those countries’ 
positions in U.S. securities during 27 true sudden stops (solid lines) and 20 sudden flight episodes (dashed 
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  27Figure 4. Evolution of GDP and its Components 
The figures depict mean year-over-year changes in real GDP and its components during 24 true sudden 
stops (solid lines) and 13 sudden flight episodes (dashed lines). Data availability limits the sample sizes in 











































































































































































































































































  28Figure 5. Evolution of Exchange Rate 
The figure depicts mean quarterly changes in the nominal exchange rate, defined as local currency per 
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  29Figure 6. Time Bunching of Episodes 
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